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robin hui huang and nicholas calcina howson
1 A Big Gap between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’
Any attempt to comprehensively analyse the enforcement of corporate
law and securities regulation is difficult, not only because there are so
many distinct national systems in play, but also because, we need to
examine both formal enforcement mechanisms and the way in which
such mechanisms are applied in practice. If nothing else, the expert
analyses presented in the foregoing chapters of this book confirm that
with respect to enforcement issues a rather large gap does exist between
what Roscoe Pound memorably called ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’.1
Across the globe, there certainly appears to be a discernible trend
toward encouraging private enforcement in recent years. As this collec-
tion demonstrates: the PRC formally allowed private claims against
securities misrepresentation in 2002;2 after the Parmalat case of 2003,
Italian courts have adjudicated several very significant civil cases con-
cerning securities misrepresentation;3 Germany introduced a model case
mechanism to provide collective redress for securities investors in 2005;4
in 2004 Japan introduced a special provision enabling investors to pursue
liability of securities issuers for misrepresentation in disclosure
documents;5 Korea passed a law in 2003 (effective from 2007) to intro-
duce a class action mechanism designed to enhance protection for small
investors in the Korean securities markets;6 in 2003, Taiwan established
a non-profit organisation successor to a similar body created in the late
1990s, the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center, which can
by itself bring a representative action with respect to an alleged securities
1 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AMER. L. REV. 12 (1910). See John
Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Richard Nolan, Chapter 13.
2 See Liming Wang, Chapter 6. 3 See Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, Chapter 19.
4 See Rainer Kulms, Chapter 18. 5 See Gen Goto, Chapter 20.
6 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Chapter 21.
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or futures-related breach which has harmed multiple securities investors
or futures traders;7 and India reformed its company law statute to allow
for class action in 2013.8 Of course, the trajectory in the US, the mother-
land of private enforcement of corporate and securities law in a decidedly
common law context, has been in the opposite direction as a result of
both statutory amendment and jurisprudential developments, and not-
withstanding the scandals that gave rise to Sarbanes-Oxley and then the
Global Financial Crisis.9
However, it is one thing to stipulate a private right of action in statute
or regulation, and it is quite another to see it implemented or pursued in
practice. In all countries and legal systems, the successful implementation
of a private enforcement scheme depends on various procedural, institu-
tional, political and cultural factors.10 In some jurisdictions that have
actually gone as far as introducing a class action mechanism, such as
Korea and India, its effectiveness has been severely curtailed by the lack of
rules allowing or governing contingency fee arrangements. In emerging
economies such as the PRC, India and Brazil, private enforcement has in
many ways been frustrated by the judiciary. For instance, the PRC had
long provided a regulatory-statutory ‘legal basis’ for civil liability for false
and misleading disclosure in its securities markets, but this could not
even begin to be implemented until 2002–2003 when the PRC Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) reversed its initial ban on acceptance of such cases
and started to allow Chinese courts to take such cases under intense
public pressure. And even after the SPC’s switch in 2002–2003, the
Chinese judicial bureaucracy has continued to use all manner of tricks
to stymie the handling of civil compensation claims for misrepresenta-
tion in the securities markets, which at least one of the authors in this
collection sees as the reason for the lower-than-expected number of
securities civil claims to date.11 Similarly, in India and Brazil, limitations
7 See Wen-Yeu Wang, Chapter 22. 8 See Vikramaditya Khanna, Chapter 16.
9 See Judge Jed Rakoff, Chapter 1; James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Chapter 12; and
John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Richard Nolan, Chapter 13.
10 See Judge Jed Rakoff, Chapter 1; Mathias Reimann, Chapter 2; and Xianchu Zhang,
Chapter 7.
11 Robin Hui Huang, Chapter 8. We should note that in some cases the PRC judiciary acts
creatively when faced with doctrinal and institutional constraints. For instance, in the
distinct area of private enforcement of corporate law fiduciary duties, one of our authors
theorises that PRC judges have enforced basically common law transplanted fiduciary
duty doctrines using the traditional civil law analytical framework for tort liability. See
Jiangyu Wang, Chapter 10. Similarly, the spirit of judicial innovation has been demon-
strated in the enforcement of China’s statutory corporate veil piercing regime. See
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associated with the functioning of the courts are identified as one of the
central challenges facing private enforcement.12
However, if something is not ‘in the books’ or is subject to some level of
regulatory or institutional constraints, one need not jump to the conclu-
sion that there results a complete vacuum, as there may be in operation
effective functional substitutes for what appears to be missing. This
volume reveals that phenomenon in spades. For instance, China does
not have class action and severely restricts both ‘group’ actions and
contingency fee arrangements,13 but the Chinese People’s Courts have
come up with a procedural innovation – something with a function
similar to the German model case regime – which allows the PRC
People’s Courts to efficiently hear multiple cases arising from the same
securities misrepresentation.14 In Japan and Italy, the lack of a class
action has not proven a fatal problem either.15 Likewise, while
Australia does not formally allow the kind of contingency fee arrange-
ments which are considered crucial for private enforcement, in practice
a third party litigation funding mechanism has served as a functional
substitute for contingency fee arrangements.16
While it is hard to determine the relative significance of public and
private enforcement in quantitative terms, from the chapters in this book
it would seem that across the globe – with the notable exception of the
US17 – private enforcement is far less important than public enforce-
ment. In Hong Kong, for example, while a private right of action is
available, it has not really been used to date, partly due to the lack of
class action, partly because of the effectiveness of public enforcement in
protecting investors. The Hong Kong securities regulator, for example,
has instead ordered issuers to repurchase from aggrieved investors the
Robin Hui Huang, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where
Is It Heading?’, 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 743 (2012).
12 John Armour and Caroline Schmidt, Chapter 23 (stating that ‘Brazilian judges are over-
worked, with a long case backlog. They are also under-trained in business matters . . . ’);
Vikramaditya Khanna, Chapter 16 (noting ‘the glacial speed of the Indian courts’).
13 See Liming Wang, Chapter 6. 14 See Robin Hui Huang, Chapter 8.
15 Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, Chapter 19 (contending that ‘the poor state of Italian
private enforcement did not depend on substantive rules or the simple absence of class
actions’); Gen Goto, Chapter 20 (opining that ‘US-style class action is not a prerequisite
for securities litigation’).
16 Michael Legg, Chapter 15 (stating ‘litigation funding addresses the cost disincentives to
the commencement of class action litigation . . . ’).
17 Even in the US, it is claimed that ‘ . . . [as] representative shareholder litigation comes
under increasing attack . . . attention has shifted to governance and market mechanisms
to address managerial agency costs’. James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Chapter 12.
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shares sold to them at inflated prices caused by misrepresentation in
public issuance documents, and ordered insiders to pay money to their
trading counterparties to restore such counterparties to the same posi-
tion, in financial terms, they were in before the insider trading prohibi-
tion-breaching trades.18 We may conclude therefore that public
enforcement in Hong Kong – rapidly becoming one of the world’s
most important securities markets – has been very effective in protecting
investors, largely obviating the need for private enforcement. Further, in
many jurisdictions where there is some allowance for private enforce-
ment in varying degrees, such as the PRC, Taiwan, Japan and Korea,
a ‘piggyback’ can be employed, whereby private enforcement always
follows after or operates in parallel with public enforcement. As many
of the authors in this collection note, this kind of piggybacking helps
private claimants overcome the evidentiary difficulties caused by the lack
of discovery rules in those jurisdictions and allows private enforcement
to benignly free ride on public enforcement.
Hence, although private enforcement seems to have become increas-
ingly important and popular amongst the national jurisdictions exam-
ined in this book, it has not yet played a very significant role in enforcing
corporate and securities laws, at least judging from the number of cases
observed to date. Of course, we recognise that it may not be appropriate
to measure the significance of private enforcement simply by reference to
the private cases which are actually brought. In Korea, for instance, the
introduction of class action is said to have generated strong deterrence so
that many Korean listed companies rushed to improve their disclosure
practices before the law took effect three years after its enactment.19
The above observations divined from the chapters presented in this
book have important implications for a more critical understanding of
the widely-accepted ‘law and finance’ literature.20 On the one hand, meth-
odologically, it is simply not adequate to solely identify formal rules for
investor protection on the books, both substantive and procedural, and
18 See Alexa Lam, Chapter 17. 19 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Chapter 21.
20 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Law and
Finance’, 106 Journal of Financial Economics 1113 (1998) (reporting that the common law
outperforms the civil law in encouraging financial development); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, 61
Journal of Finance 20 (2006) (arguing that compared with private enforcement, the
importance of public enforcement is at best modest); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-dealing’, 88
Journal of Financial Economics 430 (2008) (conducting a cross-country empirical study of
law and finance).
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then assign value to them as independent variables in cross-country and
allegedly empirical studies of ‘law and finance’. This book reveals that
although many jurisdictions have had the same or similar formal rules
on the books, the enforcement of such norms and implementation of such
procedures in practice vary greatly, always depending on the respective
institutional, political, cultural and economic environments in which they
operate. Moreover, the simple valuing of such norms or formal practices as
independent variables so characteristic of this literature completely ignores
the possibility that a given jurisdiction might use equally or more effective
substitute mechanisms, the implementation of which is invisible in these
tabulations.
On the other hand, the robust ‘legal origins’ conclusions drawn by the
‘law and finance’ studies, seem rather weak in the face of the material
presented in this book. Under the ‘legal origins’ argument, common law
jurisdictions make more use of private enforcement which correlates to
deep and more liquid securities markets. However, this book suggests
that the initial premise upon which the ‘legal origins’ edifice is built is
overly simplistic: indeed, apart from the US, all other common law
jurisdictions discussed in this book, including the UK, Australia,
Canada, India and Hong Kong, clearly put more reliance on public
enforcement than private enforcement.21 At present, these non-US com-
mon law jurisdictions seem to rely on private enforcement at a level
comparable to that in civil law jurisdictions, both in terms of the avail-
ability of the class action regime and the actual cases produced to date.
In fact, one of the chapters in this book demonstrates that historically the
level of investor protection in the UK and Germany was actually similar
over the nineteenth century.22
In short, what seems apparent from the discussion in this book and the
conference in which it is rooted is the divergence in the approaches to
enforcement of corporate and securities laws – certainly across national
jurisdictions, but more importantly even among jurisdictions sharing the
same ‘legal origins’, within the same geographical locations, or tagged
into the same developmental categories. Accordingly, rather than cele-
brating the perhaps false dream of convergence in what all admit are
increasingly globalised capital markets, this book hopes to contribute to
21 See John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, and Richard Nolan, Chapter 13
(empirically examining the role of private enforcement in the two leading common law
jurisdictions, namely the US and the UK, and finding there is divergence).
22 See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Chapter 3.
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a deeper and less synthesising understanding of persistent divergence,
and the reasons for it.23
2 A New Taxonomy of Enforcement Strategies
Enforcement strategies of corporate and securities law have traditionally
been divided into two broad categories, namely public enforcement and
private enforcement. In general, public enforcement is initiated by a state
official such as a regulator or a prosecutor, while private enforcement is
by a private party in the form of civil actions for compensation or
rescission. The public vs. private enforcement divide is based on two
general criteria: first, public and private enforcers may have differing
incentives: the former is usually paid a public servant’s salary regardless
of case outcomes, whereas the latter is primarily motivated by the pro-
spect of financial gain contingent upon success in litigation; second,
public enforcers are relatively centralised and subject to explicit political
control, whereas private claimants are not.24 Both enforcement strate-
gies, however, take the form of court proceedings.
As this bookmakes clear, the simplistic dichotomy between public and
private enforcement may not fully capture the complexity and diversity
of how corporate and securities laws are enforced in practice. For
instance, how do we understand efforts made to enforce the law but
without recourse to court proceedings? Professor John Armour of
Oxford University, one of the contributors to this book, has come up
with a new taxonomy of enforcement strategies, introducing a formal vs.
informal divide according to whether the law is enforced through state
judicial institutions. Under this two-dimensional taxonomy, there are
four types of enforcement strategies, including: formal public enforce-
ment, informal public enforcement, formal private enforcement and
informal private enforcement.25
23 See Donald Clarke, Chapter 5 (arguing that the purported ‘bonding’ effects of cross-
listings by PRC issuers might be illusory).
24 The Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center in Taiwan shows the blurring of
boundaries between public and private enforcement mechanisms: The Center can bring
private litigation for compensation on behalf of aggrieved investors but has close ties to
the government which render it ‘dangerously akin to a typical governmental adminis-
trative branch’. Wen-Yeu Wang, Chapter 22.
25 John Amour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and
Empirical Assessment’, (April 2008) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law (No 106/2008).
And see Nicholas Calcina Howson, ‘Enforcement Without Foundation? – Insider
Trading and China’s Administrative Law Crisis’, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 955 (2012)
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This categorisation of enforcement strategies represents a significant
improvement over the simple public-private dichotomy, but still has
inadequacies. To start with, the criterion used for the formal vs. informal
divide may need refinement. As noted above, the formal vs. informal
dimension is introduced to take account of those enforcement activities
which are not affected through state judicial institutions. This informal
type of enforcement activity has the advantage of economising on the
considerable costs of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. These advan-
tages, however, cannot be taken as absolute, because enforcement by
regulators may be subject to judicial review, and thus state judicial
institutions may ultimately be involved.
Importantly, the scope of enforcement activities a public regulator is
able to carry out without seeking judicial orders is a ‘rule of law’ issue.26
For instance, in the PRC the securities regulator has a wide range of
powers to freeze or seal up assets, restrict securities transactions, and
impose administrative penalties such as warnings, fines and revocation of
licences, as well as orders prohibiting the subjects of enforcement from
certain activities.27 It would be inappropriate to refer to those enforce-
ment activities as ‘informal’. The reputational sanction imposed by stock
exchanges in the form of public censure is commonly understood as
a mode of informal enforcement, but in fact, when stock exchanges
impose public censure, they need to go through the same procedure as
other disciplinary measures such as fine, suspension or delisting of
securities. Again, it would be remarkable to understand delisting deci-
sions as ‘informal enforcement’ as well. The same could be said of the
enforcement activities carried out by public regulators or stock exchanges
in many other jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, where the regulator has
power to impose public censure, fine licensed persons, and suspend or
revoke business licenses.
Under the new taxonomy, another example of informal enforcement
by regulators is a private conversation between the regulator and the firm
or securities trading party in question. This can occur in the context of
either an investigation after an alleged violation, or during an application
(demonstrating how China Securities Regulatory Commission civil enforcement of the
PRC’s insider trading prohibition is ultra vires and a breach of ‘administration according
to law’ [yifa xingzheng]).
26 See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Chapter 14 (discussing enforcement modalities from a rule of
law perspective).
27 Robin Hui Huang, Securities and Capital Markets Law in China (Oxford University Press,
2014), Chapter 2.
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for enforcement action in the future. In the former case, private con-
versations can be seen as ‘informal’ to the extent that they are not done
through any formal proceedings. It seems doubtful, however, that private
conversations regulator to regulate should be treated as a form of enfor-
cement in some cases. Private conversation is something like the threat of
sanctions, rather than actual sanctions, and in such cases sanctions are
not imposed presumably because the alleged violation is deemed too
minor to warrant enforcement. Under these circumstances, private con-
versation is more like education than enforcement in the strict sense.
In the latter case, the regulator provides guidance or even approval to
market participants in relation tomatters which have captured regulatory
attention. This might be more properly labelled a kind of ‘ex ante
enforcement’, a regulatory technique which has been used extensively
in the PRC of course where the government had maintained a tight grip
on the securities market via a host of approval requirements. For
instance, up until now, China has used a merit review regime for public
markets’ fundraising transactions, notably initial public offerings.
The non-action letter mechanism used in many jurisdictions such as
the US might be another example.
Informal private enforcement refers mainly to the exercise of corpo-
rate law-based or securities law-mandated voting rights by shareholders,
which for this context we include the ‘Wall StreetWalk’ (voting with their
feet by unloading). Formany, this so-called informal private actionmight
be more appropriately associated with ‘governance’ rather than ‘enforce-
ment’ per se.28 Even if this can be seen as enforcement in its broad sense,
it might be better addressed as ‘self-enforcement’, which usefully empha-
sises that corporate and securities law is rather uniquely enforceable by
shareholders themselves without recourse to any public institutions such
as the judiciary.29
There is, however, an urgent need to pay very close attention to private
enforcement activity which is not carried out in the courtroom. For
28 Oliver E William, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, 1996),
145–170; see also James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Chapter 12 (referring to
institutional shareholder activism and the Say-on-Pay voting mechanism as ‘governance
developments’).
29 Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, ‘A Self-EnforcingModel of Corporate Law’, 109(8)
Harvard Law Review 1911 (1996). For the PRC case, see Nicholas Calcina Howson,
‘“Quack Corporate Governance” as Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities
Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle
Against Party State Political Economic Power’, 37(2) SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667 (2014).
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instance, securities arbitration has long been an important way to settle
securities disputes.30 Indeed, that mechanism is discussed in several chap-
ters in this book as an alternative to court-based private enforcement.31
Further, many jurisdictions have special mechanisms for settling securities
markets disputes, such as the Financial Services Ombudsman in the UK
andAustralia, the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre recently established
in Hong Kong,32 and the Shenzhen Securities and Futures Dispute
Resolution Centre in the PRC. Although arbitration, mediation, and
such special mechanisms can play a role similar to that of court-based
private enforcement, they are not currently covered in the taxonomy of
enforcement strategies/mechanisms. We submit here that they might be
included in the discussion under ‘alternative private enforcement’.
In sum, this book and global practice alike teach us that the traditional
dichotomy between public and private enforcement is far too crude, and
does not adequately reflect how corporate and securities laws are
enforced in practice. In the multiplicity of global norms, procedures
and practices discussed herein, this book supports the idea that a new,
four-way taxonomy of enforcement strategies is a better starting point for
understanding – either in isolation or comparatively – the enforcement
of corporate law and securities regulation across the globe.
30 Shahla Ali and Robin Hui Huang, ‘Financial Dispute Resolution in China: Arbitration or
Court Litigation?’, 28(1) Arbitration International 77 (2012). Further, China has recently
tried to resolve securities disputes through mediation. Robin Hui Huang, ‘Securities
Dispute Mediation in China’, 10(2) Journal of Comparative Law 177 (2016).
31 See Michael Barr, Chapter 4 (stating that ‘mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are
pervasive in consumer financial and investor contracts’); Xiaochun Liu, Chapter 11
(discussing the newly established Financial Arbitration Centre under China’s Free
Trade Zone policy); Junhai Liu, Chapter 9 (stating that ‘arbitration is faster, cheaper,
more confidential, more professional’); Vikramaditya Khanna, Chapter 16 (contending
that one potential reform is to ‘have shareholders pursue corporate governance claims in
arbitral proceedings rather than in judicial or tribunal proceedings’); John Armour and
Caroline Schmidt, Chapter 23 (noting the growing role of arbitration in Brazil which is
part of ‘a mutually reinforcing system of enforcement’).
32 Robin Hui Huang, ‘In the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis: The Proposed
Establishment of a Financial Dispute Resolution Centre in Hong Kong’, 85 Australian
Law Journal 726 (2011).
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